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If the process by which we arrive at today's institutions
is relevant and constrains future choices, then not only
does history matter but persistent poor performance
and long-run divergent patterns of (socio-political and
economic) development stem from a common source.1
The meteoric rise of the Taliban (1994-1995) as an ex-
tremist Muslim militia movement in post-Soviet
Afghanistan remains an enigma to the Afghans as well
as to outside observers. What is enigmatic is not so
much where they come from, or what internal and ex-
ternal forces might be propping them up, or even the
brand of Islam they are brandishing. Rather what re-
main puzzling are questions such as: What in the
Afghan history and political culture provides space
and a place for the rise of such an extremely harsh and
violent militant movement at the dawn of the 21st cen-
tury in this beleaguered nation? Is this an expected
manifestation of recognizable historical patterns in the
country? Or is it an aberration and a product of novel
circumstances of post-jihad Afghanistan? If it is not a
novelty, as will be argued here, then how can it be ex-
plained within the parameters of Afghanistan's social
history and political culture?
The Taliban Enigma
Person-Centred Politics
& Extremism in
A f g h a n i s t a n
Manifestations of 'extremism' or 'radicalism',
whether ideological or behavioural are by de-
finition political and, as such, r e l a t i o n a l, rela-
t i v e , contested and highly contextual phe-
nomena. The most common context giving
rise to extremism (religious or otherwise),
both historically as well as in the present
time, has been the struggle for control of the
powers of the institution of state (both tradi-
tional and modern). The principal objective of
these often violent struggles has been over
the rights to control, to re-define, and even to
determine not only the basis for political le-
gitimacy and exercise of authority, but also to
proclaim what ought to constitute Muslim re-
ligious orthodoxy/orthopraxy. That is, their
goal is to articulate the nature of the relation-
ship between state and society, to define the
limits of the subjects'/citizens' rights against
the need to ensure security and sanctity of
the state, and to justify it by the particular
reading of what is held to be 'the o n l y t r u e
and authentic' practice of Islam. Therefore,
the rise of any form of extremism within a po-
litical community must be considered as a
calculated response Ð a very risky response
indeed Ð to either perceived or actual extrem-
ist policies and practices of the contestants
including the state, within the larger political
ecological and socio-economic realities shap-
ing the contest.
Person-centred politics in
A f g h a n i s t a n
Assuming that history and cultural context
profoundly condition the trajectories of fu-
ture possibilities, the following aims to ex-
plore, however briefly, the implications of
one crucial characteristic of Afghan political
culture. This characteristic is person-centred
politics within the changing contexts of
state-society relations during the anti-Com-
munist jihad as well as the post-jihad politi-
cal-ecological and political-economic envi-
ronment that has given rise to the Taliban
movement and their particularistic form of Is-
lamic extremism or Talibanism, in
Afghanistan today. Person-centred politics,
the cornerstone of kin-based mode of Push-
tun tribal social and political organization,
has been the defining attribute of Afghan
politics since the creation of Pushtun-domi-
nated centralized polity in the mid-18t h c e n-
tury by a charismatic and able Abdali Push-
tun chief, Ahmad Shah Durrani (r. 1747-
1773). According to Eric Wolf,2 the 'Achilles'
heels' and 'the diagnostic points of stress' of
kin-based politics is that a chief or leader
'draws following through judicious manage-
ment of alliances and redistributive action,
[but] he reaches a limit that can only be sur-
passed by breaking through the limitations
of the kinship order [itself]'. To overcome the
limitations of this person-centred kin-based
politics, Wolf suggests that the leader 'must
gain independent access to reliable and re-
newable resources [material, monetary, and
ideological] of his own.'
Addressing this serious limitation of per-
son-centred, kin-based political economy in
Afghanistan has been possible, however
brief, by two major means. During the 18t h
and 19t h centuries, it was through the fruits of
waging jihad, initially against non-Muslims in
the Indian subcontinent, and then internally
against the non-Pushtun communities to im-
pose a form of internal colonialism. And dur-
ing the latter parts of 19t h and the 20t h c e n-
turies it was through solicitation/offer of for-
eign subsidies, mostly from real and/or po-
tential enemies of the nation. The effective-
ness of these strategies, however, has proved
to be episodic and transient.
The costs of the failure to resolve this seri-
ous problem of political economy of the
state for Afghanistan have been very heavy.
The primary reason for the failure has been
the unwillingness or inability of the leader-
ship to shift from a tribal political culture an-
chored in person-centred politics to a
broader, more inclusive, participatory na-
tional politics based on the development of
modern national institutions and ideolo-
gies. As a result, during its 250-year history
of statehood, Afghanistan has suffered
through at least 100 years of fratricidal wars
of succession and/or pacification (often
called jihad by the contestants) with devas-
tating consequences and painful legacies.
These bloody internal conflicts, which have
facilitated (invited) foreign aggressive inter-
ventions (British, Russian and now Pakistani,
Iranian and others), even when dressed with
ideological justifications (Islamic or other-
wise), were fought not for or against any
ideological or institutional cause or causes.
Instead, they were fought for or against spe-
cific individuals, families or clans out of per-
sonal, but often rapidly shifting, commoditi-
cized loyalties (primordial and/or ac-
q u i r e d / p u r c h a s e d ) .
The legacies of person-centred
politics in Afghanistan
Modern state building efforts in
Afghanistan began (in 1880) with unprece-
dented brutality against large segments of
society, especially by violence directed
against non-Durrani Pushtun and certain
non-Pushtun groups. The rulers utilized the
discourses of Islam, tribe/kinship and Durrani
kingship to hold together a myriad of linguis-
tic, sectarian and tribal groups in virtual sub-
jugation within a buffer state. Resistance and
popular revolts against the state were repeat-
edly crushed with weapons and money pro-
vided to the governments by outside colonial
powers, initially Great Britain and later the for-
mer Soviet Union. These efforts, however, did
not disrupt the kin-based personalized poli-
tics of what Edward Banfield termed 'amoral
familism'3 Ð a tendency to 'maximize material,
short-run advantage of the É family [and
kin], assuming that all others will do like-wise'
Ð but strengthened them. Indeed, it can be ar-
gued that the contradictory policies and prac-
tices of state building in Afghanistan have
promoted a political culture of person-cen-
tred politics to the virtual exclusion of nurtur-
ing broader and more inclusive national ide-
ologies, institutions and moral principles.
Therefore, it is contended that the rise of Tal-
iban movement during the post-jihad crises
of succession, with their form of Islamic ex-
tremism or Talibanism, is the inevitable culmi-
nation of the historical legacies of the person-
centred, Pashtun-dominated, Afghan political
culture. The most significant of these legacies,
although by no means exhaustive of all the
possibilities, include:
Firstly, consistent policies and practices of
political mistrust directed against the great
majority of Afghan subjects/citizens by state
authorities have promoted an attitude of dis-
trust of politics and politicians by the citizens.
Such prolonged experiences, in turn have se-
riously weakened traditional communities of
trust (jamacat), i.e., civil society. And it has
caused the general erosion of trust as a 'social
capital' in Afghan society beyond the circles
of family and close kinsmen or at most one's
own ethnolinguistic group.
Secondly, person-centred, paternalistic pol-
itics encouraged commoditization of loyal-
ties, the creation of a political economy of de-
pendency and patron-client relationships at
all levels of Afghan society, including the in-
creasing dependence of governments on for-
eign aid. This situation has been further exac-
erbated because of the collapse of the state
and the rise of multiple centres of power, all
of them receiving assistance (economic and
military) from numerous governmental and
non-governmental international agencies
during the more than two decades of a devas-
tating war. This new political ecological con-
dition of continuous warfare has also intro-
duced a new weapon in the arsenals of per-
son-centred political combatants. It is access
to a thriving print and electronic media Ð in-
side Afghanistan, in Afghan refugee commu-
nities around the world as well as the BBC and
VOA radio services in Dari and Pashto lan-
guages Ð utilized for a more effective vilifica-
tion and demonization of the opponent's
character. These pervasive attempts at mutu -
al character assassinations have left no room
for the possibility of constructive dialogue
and discussion about national goals, ideas or
strategies, and have led to the inevitable es-
calation of political contests into violent mili-
tary conflicts, justified increasingly by adher-
ence to religious extremism and Talibanism.
Thirdly, person-centred politics has placed
all ideologies (Islamic and otherwise) and
moral principles at the service of preserving
self-interest and protection of personal, famil-
ial, tribal or ethnic group honour. This has re-
sulted in serious discrepancies between pub-
lic policy pronouncements of the contending
groups and their actual practices. The Taliban
claims of being inclusive of all ethnic groups
and of bringing peace and security to territo-
ries under their control while committing
some of the worst ethnic cleansing violence
against non-Pushtuns in their conquered re-
gions; and contrary to explicit Islamic princi-
ples, the rising production of opium poppies,
and the manufacture, sales and trafficking of
elicit drugs in the areas under the Taliban
control may be a case in point.
Fourthly, the treatment of non-Pushtun cit-
izens of Afghanistan as mere internal 'colo-
nial' subjects (not citizens, at least not 'real
Afghans') has produced a deep sense of alien-
ation, resentment, and distrust. Their role in
national history was depicted as marginal and
their participation in national politics was
purposefully undermined. That is, through a
well-established policy of demographic ag-
gression, ranging from resettlement of Push-
tun in non-Pushtun territories to underesti-
mating the actual numbers by administrative
means,7 their political representation in na-
tional assemblies were severely curtailed. At
the same time, non-Pushtun groups were
subjected to excessive conscription (for mili-
tary service and corve labour) extraction by
taxation, appropriation, looting and other
extra judicial exactions. It is because of these
painful historical memories of oppression and
injustice that non-Pushtun minorities in
Afghan Taliban
soldiers pose in
Kabul on their
way to the
frontlines north
of the capital.
